FIU Law Review
Volume 15
Number 1 Symposium: The Legal Legacy of the
Special Court for Sierra Leone (Miami, Florida,
2020)

Article 16

2021

The Important Contributions of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
on Amnesties and Immunities: Reinforcing Foundational
Principles of International Criminal Law
Leila Nadya Sadat
Washington University in St. Louis, School of Law, sadat@wustl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, International
Humanitarian Law Commons, International Law Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, Jurisprudence
Commons, and the Other Law Commons

Online ISSN: 2643-7759
Recommended Citation
Leila N. Sadat, The Important Contributions of the Special Court for Sierra Leone on Amnesties and
Immunities: Reinforcing Foundational Principles of International Criminal Law, 15 FIU L. Rev. 73 (2021).
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.25148/lawrev.15.1.16

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU
Law Review by an authorized editor of eCollections. For more information, please contact lisdavis@fiu.edu.

13 - SADAT (DO NOT DELETE)

7/11/2021 12:22 PM

THE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE SPECIAL
COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE ON AMNESTIES AND
IMMUNITIES: REINFORCING FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
Prof. Leila Nadya Sadat*
The book that is the centerpiece of this Micro-Symposium, The Legal
Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone,1 is an important contribution
to international law and practice. Authored by Charles Jalloh, a distinguished
practitioner of international criminal law, the book is essential reading for
anyone who wishes to understand the legal ramifications of the Special Court
and its work. It is comprehensive, without being overwhelming, and analyzes
many of the most important elements of the Court’s legal work. It is a perfect
companion to his equally excellent edited book on the subject, The Sierra
Leone Special Court and Its Legacy.2
The Court’s establishment was a response to atrocities committed
during the Sierra Leone Civil War, which began in 1991 and raged for over
a decade. The conflict was notorious “for its brutality and the commission of
some of the worst atrocities against civilians ever witnessed in a
contemporary conflict.”3 As war was ongoing in Sierra Leone, other conflicts
were in progress elsewhere, including the war in the former Yugoslavia and
the Rwandan genocide. In 1993, the international community established an
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and a
second sister tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), to try those responsible for crimes
against humanity, genocide, and serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in those conflicts.
The Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals were impactful institutions that
reignited a global thirst for justice in the face of atrocity crimes. Their
creation gave wings to the dream of those who had long advocated for a
permanent international criminal court, the Statute for which was ultimately
adopted in 1998 and entered into force in 2002. When the conflict in Sierra
Leone ended in 2001, the expectation that criminal trials would be held for
*

James Carr Professor of International Criminal Law, Director, Whitney R. Harris World Law
Institute, Washington University School of Law. Sadat@wustl.edu.
1 See generally CHARLES C. JALLOH, THE LEGAL LEGACY OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA
LEONE (2020) [hereinafter JALLOH, LEGAL LEGACY].
2 See generally THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY (Charles Chernor Jalloh,
ed., 2014).
3 JALLOH, LEGAL LEGACY, supra note 1, at 31.
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the perpetrators of atrocity crimes was high. Moreover, as Professor Jalloh
notes, the government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations were
supportive of the idea that there should be a tribunal to try the perpetrators of
the war.4 Yet the ICTY and the ICTR had experienced some difficulties in
their early years, which, combined with their high cost, caused “tribunal
fatigue” to set in with at least some members of the United Nations Security
Council, who were therefore opposed to creating another Chapter VII ad hoc
tribunal for Sierra Leone.5 A creative workaround was found: although the
Security Council adopted Resolution 1315 regarding the court’s
establishment, rather than attach a Statute directly to the Resolution, as it had
done with the ICTY and the ICTR, it empowered the Secretary-General to
negotiate with the Kabbah government to establish the Court.6
For this reason, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), as the Court
came to be known, was therefore neither a Chapter VII-backed tribunal
(along the lines of the ICTY or the ICTR) nor an entirely domestic court.
Instead, it was established sui generis, via a bilateral agreement between the
United Nations and Sierra Leone.7 The agreement establishing the Court was
signed on January 16, 2002, and entered into force on April 12, 2002, with
the Statute of the Court annexed thereto.8 The manner of the Court’s creation
became important in the Taylor case when the question of Charles Taylor’s
possible immunity as a Head of State was raised as a bar to his prosecution.
The SCSL was the first modern international criminal court located in
the country where the crimes being prosecuted had occurred. (The
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia swiftly followed suit).9
Although this presented security concerns, it had many benefits, particularly
in terms of impacting public opinion in the host country.10 If location in the
host country was a positive, a major negative was that the Court was
dependent on voluntary contributions as opposed to receiving funding from
the regular UN budget. Many court personnel have described how difficult
4

Id. at 44.
Id. at 45.
6 Id. at 51 (citing S.C. Resolution 1315 (Aug. 14, 2000)).
7 Id. at 55.
8 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter UNSierra Leone Agreement]. Annexed to the UN, Sierra Leone Agreement was the Statute of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone.
9 See generally David M. Crane, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, in THE FOUNDERS (David
M. Crane, Leila N. Sadat & Michael P. Scharf eds., 2018); Robert Petit, Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia, in THE FOUNDERS (David M. Crane, Leila N. Sadat, and Michael P. Scharf, eds.
2018).
10 JALLOH, LEGAL LEGACY, supra note 1, at 57–58. As Professor Jalloh notes, however, this
solution may not be ideal where the security situation is too challenging or other obstacles to judicial or
prosecutorial independence exist. Id.
5
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funding concerns made their jobs and detracted from their ability to fully
focus on their mission. The book also notes that the justice the SCSL
administered was neither fully complete nor in and of itself sufficient to fully
remedy the harm that the atrocities committed during the Sierra Leonean civil
war inflicted on the small West African nation. The SCSL tried only a
handful of individuals, both for financial reasons and due to the limitation in
Article 1(1) of the Statute that the Court should prosecute those bearing the
“greatest responsibility.”11 The parallel work of the Truth Commission was
important as well; indeed, as Professor Jalloh notes, the “Sierra Leone
transitional justice experiment exposed important legal and policy issues”
about how a criminal court and a truth commission can coexist in a
complementary manner.12
Several chapters address specific important legal questions that arose
during the proceedings. A full treatment of these issues is beyond the scope
of this short contribution. Instead, I have focused attention upon two key
elements, about which I have written elsewhere, and which remain both
important and contested areas of modern international criminal law: Head of
State immunity (Chapter Eight) and Amnesties (Chapter Nine). A brief
comment on these chapters follows.
Amnesties: As Professor Jalloh notes, in the years prior to the SCSL’s
establishment, President Kabbah endeavored to put an end to the conflict by
negotiating with the rebels. In 1999, he signed the “Lomé Peace Agreement”
with Corporal Foday Sankoh, the leader of the Revolutionary United Front.13
The Secretary-General of the United Nations and outside governments and
organizations also signed as “moral guarantors” of the agreement.14 Article
IX of the Lomé Agreement, entitled “Pardon and Amnesty,” created
significant difficulties for the SCSL because it guaranteed “an absolute and
free pardon” to RUF leader Sankoh and required “the government of Sierra
Leone [to] grant absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combatants and
collaborators in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their
objectives, up to the time of the signing of the present agreement.”15
Following signature of the Lomé Peace Agreement, it was announced that
the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Francis Okello, had
entered a disclaimer that the United Nations would not recognize the validity
of the amnesty as regards the “international crimes of genocide, crimes

11

UN-Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 8.
JALLOH, LEGAL LEGACY, supra note 1, at 351.
13 Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front
of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL), Lomé, July 7, 1999 [hereinafter Lomé Agreement].
14 Id.
15 Id. at art. IX.
12
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against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law.”16
The Lomé Agreement did not stop the RUF from killing and mutilating
civilians. They maintain their control over diamond operations which
provided them with funds. At one point, they abducted more than 500 UN
peacekeepers, seized their weapons, arms, and uniforms, and murdered
several.17 President Kabbah, who had previously supported the amnesty
because he felt it would bring the war to an end, now vigorously advocated
for trials. The result was the establishment of the SCSL, which included a
provision specifically eliminating amnesties for international crimes in
Article 10 of its Statute.
Once before the SCSL, the defendants argued that the Court could not
“try them for acts committed before July 1999 given the unconditional
amnesty/pardon that the Sierra Leone government had conferred on them.”18
The Appeals Chamber disagreed. The Chamber found that the amnesty
granted in the Lomé Agreement was tantamount to a domestic amnesty, as
the Lomé Agreement did not have an international character. Therefore, it
was inapplicable before the Special Court. Likewise, the Appeals Chamber
found that whatever affect the amnesty may have had in the courts of Sierra
Leone, it could have no effect in protecting the defendants from universal
jurisdiction prosecutions brought by other States. In a particularly notable
passage, the Appeals Chamber observed:
Where jurisdiction is universal, a State cannot deprive another
State of its jurisdiction to prosecute the offender by the grant of
amnesty. It is for this reason unrealistic to regard as
universally effective the grant of amnesty by a State in regard
to grave international crimes in which there exists universal
jurisdiction. A State cannot bring into oblivion and
forgetfulness a crime, such as a crime against international law,
which other States are entitled to keep alive and remember.19
As Professor Jalloh notes, the Appeals Chamber did not categorically
find that amnesties for war crimes and crimes against humanity granted by
states were unlawful under international law, although it appeared to lean in
that direction. This is suggested by the fact, as he observes, the Chamber
16 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special
Court for Sierra Leone, 23, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000).
17 DAVID SCHEFFER, ALL THE MISSING SOULS: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS 305−06 (2011).
18 JALLOH, LEGAL LEGACY, supra note 1, at 287.
19 Prosecutor v. Kallon, Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty, Case Nos.
SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E), ¶ 3 (SCSL App. Ch., Mar. 13, 2004) [hereinafter
Kallon & Kamara].
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could have decided the case on narrow grounds by simply limiting its
decision to the effect of the Lomé Agreement before the SCSL. Instead, the
Appeals Chamber observed that the crimes had the character of peremptory
norms of international law, which generated obligations erga omnes to all
states, and that there is a “crystallizing international norm that a government
cannot grant amnesty for serious violations of crimes under international
law.”20
Of particular interest is Professor Jalloh’s discussion of scholars’
reaction to the Appeals Chamber’s decision. As he observes, most scholars
agree with the Appeals Chamber’s holding that the Lomé Agreement did not
provide the accused with a defense to proceedings before the SCSL. Some,
such as Antonio Cassese, found the result correct but the reasoning legally
flawed. Others, including this writer, have opined that both the result and the
reasoning were important and influential contributions to international law.21
A third group of scholars, including William Schabas, have been deeply
critical of the decision, suggesting that it used “extravagant language” and
did not properly address the complexities of the issues involved.22 In the view
of this writer, the Appeals Chamber’s amnesty decision, and the reasoning
undergirding it, have stood the test of time. I explain why below after taking
up the second critical issue decided by the Chamber on the question of Head
of State immunity.
Head of State immunity: Chapter Eight sets out the legal issues posed by
the decision of the Court’s Chief Prosecutor to prosecute Charles Taylor, who
was, at the time of his indictment, the President of Liberia. Taylor’s defense
team argued that as a Head of State he was immune from prosecution.23
Relying upon the decision of the International Court of Justice in Yerodia,24
which had held that Belgium could not issue an arrest warrant directed at a

20

Id. ¶ 82; JALLOH, LEGAL LEGACY, supra note 1, at 290−91.
Leila Nadya Sadat, The Lomé Amnesty Decision of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in THE
SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY 311, 323−24 (Charles Chernor Jalloh, ed., 2014)
[hereinafter Sadat, Lomé Amnesty Decision].
22 William A. Schabas, Amnesty, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 145, 163 (2004).
23 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I-024, Applicant’s motion made under protest and
without waiving of immunity accorded to a Head of State President Charles Ghankay Taylor requesting
that the Trial Chamber do quash the said approved indictment of 7 March 2003 of Judge Bankole
Thompson and that the aforesaid purported Warrant of Arrest and Order for Transfer and Detention of the
same date issued by Judge Bankole Thompson of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and all other
consequential and related ORDER(S) granted thereafter by either the said Judge Bankole Thompson OR
Judge Pierre Boutet on 12 June 2003 against the person of the said president Charles Ghankay Taylor be
declared null and void, invalid at their inception and that they be accordingly canceled and/OR set aside
as a matter of law (July 23, 2003) [hereinafter Taylor, Motion to Quash Indictment Based on Immunity].
24 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14,
2002).
21
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sitting Congolese Foreign Minister, the Taylor defense argued essentially that
Taylor was immune from criminal prosecution because the Special Court was
tantamount to a domestic tribunal. The Special Court disagreed, finding that
the SCSL was an international criminal tribunal and therefore entitled to
exercise jurisdiction over Taylor.25
In Taylor, the SCSL Appeals Chamber relied upon the decision in
Yerodia to distinguish the jurisdiction of international and national criminal
tribunals when faced with Heads of State or other high-ranking members of
government. At the same time, the Chamber admitted that it was not
immediately evident why national and international courts differ as to their
treatment of immunities under international law. Its reasons included the fact
that no question of state sovereignty was raised given the Court’s status as an
international organ, and that as a matter of policy, States have accepted that
the collective judgment of the international community provides a vital
safeguard against the potential destabilizing effect of unilateral judgments in
this area.26 As Professor Jalloh notes, although the reasoning of this decision
has been criticized,27 many other observers28—including Professor Jalloh
himself—believe that the Appeals Chamber came to the right result, even if
the manner in which it did so was not entirely convincing.
*
* *
It is not the purpose of this short contribution to thoroughly address the
question of immunities and amnesties before international criminal courts
and tribunals in a comprehensive manner. I have addressed many of these
questions in earlier writings, and space does not permit a complete treatment
here.29 However, I would like to briefly draw attention to the question of
methodology and approach, for, as is generally the case when resolving a
legal ambiguity, the outcome depends upon the initial questions presented.

25 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-1, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction (SCSL
App. Ch., May 1, 2004).
26 Id. ¶ 51 (citing Amicus Brief of Professor Diane Orentlicher, at 15); see also Sadat, Lomé
Amnesty Decision, supra note 21, at 318−19.
27 See, e.g., Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court,
98 AM. J. INT’L L. 420 (2004).
28 Micaela Frulli, Piercing the Veil of Head of State Immunity: The Taylor Trial and Beyond, in
THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY 311, 339 (Charles Chernor Jalloh ed., 2014).
29 See, e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, Exile, Amnesty and International Law, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 955
(2006); Leila Nadya Sadat, Heads of State and Other Government Officials Before the International
Criminal Court: The Uneasy Revolution Continues, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 96 (Margaret M. deGuzman & Valerie Oosterveld eds., 2020); Leila Nadya Sadat,
International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL
PROCEDURAL
LAW,
https://opil-ouplaw-com.ezproxy.law.wustl.edu/view/10.1093/lawmpeipro/e1710.013.1710/law-mpeipro-e1710?rskey=D6UqoL&result=1&prd=MPIL.
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Scholars and practitioners of international criminal law tend to approach
the question of amnesties, immunities, jurisdiction and other elements of
international criminal law (as regards core crimes) from two different and
competing perspectives. Some view the question of whether the immunities
of Heads of State extant in interstate proceedings apply before international
courts and tribunals, or regarding the effect of domestic amnesties before
international courts and tribunals, as requiring a comprehensive examination
of state practice in national cases (the statist approach). Others begin with the
international system and the principles underscoring it (the internationalist
approach).
The statist approach was particularly evident in the litigation before the
International Criminal Court on the question of whether the ICC could
exercise jurisdiction over a Head of State from a nonstate party in a situation
that had been referred to the court by the United Nations Security Council.
The argument was made by several states and litigants, as well as by amici
and many scholars, that State practice regarding interstate exercises of
criminal jurisdiction applied by analogy to the International Criminal Court’s
exercise of jurisdiction over Heads of State.30 This “ground up” approach,
which some members of the International Law Commission (ILC) have also
employed in the ILC’s study on immunity, causes them to ask whether state
practice supports the jus cogens regime in national and international
jurisdictions. 31 In other words, they make no distinction between jus cogens
and non jus cogens offenses, which are international crimes that are the
subject of a nonderogable prohibition under international law. This also
conflates principles of international law applicable in interstate proceedings
with the regime applicable to the direct application of international criminal
law in international criminal courts and tribunals. Thus, they do not clearly
distinguish between the application of immunities or other elements of
international criminal law on a vertical, as opposed to a horizontal, level.
A second internationalist approach, which I have argued in a recent
essay on the Al Bashir case at the ICC,32 is a more suitable framework in
analyzing these issues before international criminal courts and tribunals, is to
understand the question of the immunity of Heads of State before
international criminal tribunals as based upon international, not national,
practice, for international courts and tribunals do not derive their power from
delegations of state jurisdiction (although “delegation” sometimes surfaces
as a description of how States may create an international organization).
30

Sadat, Heads of State and Other Government Officials, supra note 29.
See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Immunity Rationae Materiae of State Officials from Foreign
Criminal Jurisdiction: Where Is the State Practice in Support of Exceptions?, 112 AJIL UNBOUND 4
(2018).
32 Sadat, Heads of State and Other Government Officials, supra note 29.
31
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Instead, at least since the establishment of the United Nations system, the
international legal system and the institutions created therein operate in an
autonomous sphere (limited by their Charters and international law). In the
immunities decision, the SCSL found that the Court, because of the manner
of its creation and its pedigree, was an “international court” along the lines
of similarly created (although not identical) institutions – the ICTY, the
ICTR, and, of course, the ICC. For this reason, it found that it fit squarely
within the Yerodia exception. Likewise, in its 2019 decision in the Al Bashir
case, the ICC Appeals Chamber resolved the case similarly. Although Jordan
had argued before the Appeals Chamber that the ICC was a “foreign” court,
and that it could not exercise jurisdiction over Al Bashir, who was a sitting
Head of State, without Sudan’s permission, the Appeals Chamber relied,
inter alia, upon the decision of the SCSL to find
There is neither state practice nor opinio juris that would
support the existence of Head of State
immunity
under
customary international law vis-à-vis an international court. To
the contrary, such immunity has never been recognized in
international law as a bar to the jurisdiction of an international
court.33
The ICC Appeals Chamber decision was accompanied by a concurrence
addressing the question of what is meant by the term “international court.”
The concurrence defines “international court” as “an adjudicatory body that
exercises jurisdiction at the behest of two or more states” 34 and refers to the
SCSL’s Taylor case as evidence that Heads of State do not have immunity
before international criminal courts as regards the commission of
international crimes. While the opinion may be broader than strictly required,
the ICC Appeals Chamber took the view that the question of whether an
international court must respect the immunity of a Head of State on
international crimes is governed by international law principles that are
different than the question of immunities before national courts. Which, of
course, is implied by Yerodia itself.
Whether the ICC Appeals Chamber sufficiently addressed the
thoughtful concerns raised by Professor Jalloh regarding the outer limits or
even threshold inquiry of the “international court” requirement remains to be
seen. Yet it seems to me that Professor Jalloh overstates the position of
scholars when he argues that they nearly all agree that it is not the fact that it

33 Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2, Judgment in the Jordan Referral Re
Al Bashir Appeal, 5 (May 6, 2019).
34 Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2, Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges
Eboe-Usuji, Morrison, Hofmanski and Bossa to Judgment in the Jordan Referral Re Al-Bashir Appeal, ¶
56 (May 6, 2019).
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is an international court that is determinative.35 In fact, it is the combination
of an international criminal court hearing a case in which core international
crimes are adjudicated that gives rise to the proposition that no immunities
apply. In the Al Bashir case, Professor Claus Kress argued that this was
mandated by customary international law. The Appeals Chamber found no
rule of custom created the immunities because they had never existed before
international criminal courts and tribunals. Either way, it is most certainly the
combination of international adjudication combined with an indictment for
core crimes that causes the immunity claim to fail.
Turning to the question of amnesties, the Special Court for Sierra Leone
took essentially the same approach as it (later) did on the problem of
immunities, finding that as an international court, the SCSL was not bound
by the provisions of the Lomé Agreement and therefore did not need to
investigate whether or not the blanket amnesty offered by the Lomé Peace
Agreement was valid before the courts of Sierra Leone. It did suggest,
however, that the prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity
were possibly required given the peremptory nature of the norm and its erga
omnes character.36 Professor Jalloh has criticized not only this element of the
case but also the decision that the amnesty was inapplicable before the SCSL
itself, as representing “a judicial misunderstanding of how customary
international law is formed,”37 citing the Jurisdictional Immunities case of
the ICJ for a repudiation of the distinction between substance and
procedure.38 This is where we part company because, as noted above, my
(internationalist) starting point is quite different.
In my view, the Jurisdictional Immunities case has not set aside the
important developments of international criminal law that have, since the
Nuremberg judgment (and as codified by the ILC itself in its 1996 Draft Code
of Crimes), seen the jus cogens or peremptory nature of crimes against
humanity, war crimes, genocide, and aggression as accompanied by a
necessary procedural regime that ensures that their application can be
successful. Given that Jurisdictional Immunities did not decide anything
about international criminal prosecutions at all—but involved civil claims
brought against the Federal Republic of Germany in Italian courts based upon
violations of international humanitarian law—it cannot be relied upon to
show that the jus cogens status of an offense is meaningless as regards
procedural issues such as standing, amnesties, immunities, etc. before an
international criminal court or tribunal. The better view was expressed by the
35

JALLOH, LEGAL LEGACY, supra note 1, at 267.
Kallon & Kamara, supra note 19, ¶ 71.
37 JALLOH, LEGAL LEGACY, supra note 1, at 299.
38 Id.; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), 2012 ICJ 96 (Feb. 3, 2012). The Court’s
judgment was also the subject of an important dissent authored by Judge Cançado Trindade.
36
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International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v.
Furundžija, regarding the crime of torture:
While the erga omnes nature [of the crime] appertains to the
area of international enforcement (lato sensu), the other major
feature of the principle prescribing torture relates
to
the
hierarchy of rules in the international normative order. Because
of the importance of the values it protects, this principle has
evolved into a peremptory norm or jus cogens. . . .39
The Trial Chamber thus found, inter alia, albeit in dicta, that amnesties
for international crimes were not permissible before international criminal
courts. As to the legality of amnesties before national courts, that is, either in
the jurisdictions where they were granted, or in interstate cases, the cases are
unanimous in striking down blanket amnesties in national courts for core
international crimes, suggesting that the SCSL got it right in 2004. It is odd
that the Special Court of Sierra Leone’s decision on amnesties should
therefore have attracted so much criticism, given that its amnesty judgment
is completely consistent with existing case law emanating from international
and national courts. This was true in 2006 when I wrote an article surveying
existing case law,40 and Amnesty International completed a study in 2017
confirming the trend that was submitted to the International Law Commission
as part of its project on crimes against humanity.41
These issues are complex, and it is difficult to do them justice in just a
few pages. Yet, as this short contribution surely shows, the work of the
Special Court for Sierra Leone and the analysis of the Court’s work by
Professor Jalloh are of great contemporary relevance.

39 Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment ¶ 153 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).
40 Sadat, Exile, Amnesty and International Law, supra note 29, at 1022−23.
41 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONAL SUPPORT TO THE DRAFT
ARTICLES ON CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY ADOPTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION IN
FIRST READING (2017), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/IOR4073282017ENGLISH.pdf.

